


SOLVING TWO-MOVE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION

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## SUMMARY

A two-move game with perfect information is considered, such as a move and counter-move situation between two firms or economies. This leads to the problem of finding a global minimum of a concave function over a convex domain and the distressing possibility of local minima at every extreme point. It is shown however that the global minimum can be obtained by solving a linear programming system with side conditions that at least one of certain pairs of variables vanish. The latter problem can be shown to be equivalent to solving a linear programming problem with some integer valued variables.

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Consider a two-move game where player X can engage in any vector  $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n)$  of activity levels  $\mathbf{x}_j \geq 0$ , consistent with a fixed inventory vector  $\mathbf{e} = (\mathbf{e}_1, \mathbf{e}_2, \dots, \mathbf{e}_m)$ , say

$$(1) Ex = e (x \ge 0)$$

where E is an m x n matrix. This constitutes X's move. In so doing he leaves an inventory position f + Ex for player Y where E is a given m' x n matrix and f an m' component vector. This requires that Y chose as his move an activity vector  $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{n'})$  so that

where F is a given m' x n' matrix. It is assumed that x must be chosen so that an admissible move for Y exists. We remark in passing that a chess or checker game restricted to one move by each player can be cast in this form if there are added side constraints regarding the discrete character of a move.

Nowever a competitive situation of a move and a counter-move between two firms or two economies, would be more significant.

Let us suppose the payment to Y by X is given by

$$z = \alpha x - \beta y$$

where  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n)$  and  $\beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_n)$ . It is clear that an optimum for X is to chose x so that his payment to Y is

(4) 
$$\hat{z} = \min_{\mathbf{x}} \left[ \alpha \mathbf{x} - \min_{\mathbf{y} \mid \mathbf{x}} \beta \mathbf{y} \right]$$

where we further assume  $\beta$ y is bounded from below for fixed x.

This is basically a very difficult problem because Miny By for y satisfying (2) is a convex function of x but this implies that

(5) 
$$z' = [\alpha x - Min_y by]$$

is a concave function of x which is to be minimized over a convex domain of x satisfying (1) and (2). This can lead to local optima at one, many, or all extreme points of the convex domain of x.


For example suppose

(6) 
$$x_1 \le 1$$
  $x_1 \ge 0$   $y_1 \le 1 - x_1$   $y_1 \ge 0$   $y_1 \le x_1$   $z = 0 \cdot x_1 - (-y_1) = y_1$ ,

then the function z' to be minimized is

(7) 
$$z' = -\min(-y) = \begin{cases} x_1 & \text{if } 0 \le x_1 \le 1/2 \\ 1 - x_1 & \text{if } 1/2 \le x_1 \le 1 \end{cases}$$

which has two local minima, one at  $x_1 = 0$  and the other at  $x_1 = 1$ :



The values of z' at these local minima happen to be equal but a slight perturbation could cause either one to be the global minimum.

By careful application of the duality theorem this problem can be reduced to a linear programming problem subject to a set of n' pairs of linear conditions either  $y_j \ge 0$  or  $\eta_j \ge 0$  for j = 1, 2, ..., n'; here  $\eta_j$  are the dual variables along with  $\pi = (\pi_1, \pi_2, ..., \pi_m)$  satisfying

(9) 
$$\pi F_{j} + \eta_{j} = \beta_{j}$$
  $\eta_{j} \geq 0, (j=1,2,...,n')$ 

where  $F_j$  is the  $j^{th}$  column of F. We first remark for any fixed x, there exist an optimum  $y = y^*$  satisfying (2) which minimizes  $\beta y$ . Associated with this x is also an optimum solution to the dual of (2) with variables  $\pi$  (unrestricted in sign associated with the m' equations) and non-negative variables  $n_j \geq 0$  corresponding to  $y_j$  satisfying (9). The necessary and sufficient conditions that a solution of the primal and dual systems be optimal is that

(10) either 
$$y_j = 0$$
 for  $j = 1, 2, ..., n'$ 
or  $\eta_j = 0$ .

We now prove the following fundamental theorem:

THEOREM: An optimal solution to the two-move game (1), (3) is found by choosing x and y satisfying (1) and (2), auxiliary variables  $\pi$  and  $\eta$  satisfying (9) and (10), and Min z satisfying (3).

Proof: The proof is along standard lines and immediate. An optimal solution to the game exists at one of the extreme points of the convex of x defined by (1) and (2) say at  $x = \hat{x}$  for which there is a  $y = \hat{y}$  and  $\pi = \hat{\pi}$ ,  $\eta = \hat{\eta}$  that satisfy (2), (9), (10) and yields the value  $z = \hat{z}$  defined by (4). Hence

$$(11) \qquad \qquad \text{Min } \mathbf{z} \leq \mathbf{2}$$

On the other hand we can produce a solution  $x^*, y^*, \pi^*, \eta^*$  to (1), (2) (9), (10) which minimizes z by devices considered in [1] which shows that this type of problem is equivalent to a linear programming problem with some integer valued variables for which efficient procedure may exist [2], [3]. For the chosen value of  $x = x^*$ , (10) implies that the  $y^*$  is chosen so as to minimize  $\beta y$ . Hence the set of  $x^*, y^*$ , chosen this way is an admissible two moves in a game and its  $z = \min z$  must satisfy

2 < Min = 3

(12)

whence from (11) we have

(13)

2 = Min z

completing the proof.

## REFERENCES

- 1. Dantzig, George B., "On the Significance of Solving Linear Programming Problems with Some Integer Variables," to appear.
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- 3. Beale, E.M.L., "A Method of Solving Linear Programming Problems with Some but Not all of the Variables must take Integral Values." Unpublished draft approximately dated May 1958.